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Abstract
Knowledge is one of the most important determinants in single-industry studies of firm sur-
vival over the life cycle. Different kinds of knowledge, namely post-entry experience, pre-
entry experience, and knowledge acquired by innovative activity positively influence the sur-
vival chances of firms. This paper investigates how the kinds of knowledge are able to com-
pensate for each other. Therefore, a statistical survival analysis is performed for the German
automobile industry which applies a new approach that combines the Cox regression with
instrumental variable estimation. The results show that innovative activity is able to compen-
sate for lacking post-entry experience, supporting Schumpeterian creative destruction.
JEL classification: L10, L62, O33, C41
keywords: firm survival, patents, innovation, automobile industry, hazard rates2
1.  Introduction
Knowledge is an important aspect of economic life, but has received only a crude treatment in
scientific economic analyses. This treatment frequently consists of the consideration of
knowledge as an accumulable factor of production that contributes in the production function
in addition to and just like labor, capital, materials, etc. by shifting the production function
over time (Griliches (1979)). In the growth models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) microfoundations are provided that explain the (aggregate) effects of knowledge either
by an increasing variety of intermediate products which are used to assemble the final product
or by increasing quality of these intermediate products.
In evolutionary economics knowledge acquired by agents in an cumulative process is con-
ceived as incomplete. There are differences of the accumulated knowledge between the actors
of an economy, so that they are heterogeneous. A detailed discussion of the role of knowledge
in evolutionary economics can be found in Loasby (1999). There it is explored how the limi-
tations of human knowledge create opportunities as well as problems in a modern economy.
In general, knowledge can be divided in knowing that (knowledge of facts, relationships and
theories) and knowing how (ability to perform appropriate actions to achieve a desired result).
Loasby (1999) describes the evolution of knowledge as a path-dependent process in which the
acquirement of new knowledge depends on the knowledge accumulated before. Furthermore
differences in knowledge arise from learning-by-doing in different activities as a result of the
division of labor. In the following we restrict the notion knowledge to the knowing-how as-
pect.
In the present article we deal with this aspect of knowledge as a key determinant of firm sur-
vival in the German automobile industry. The life-cycle literature distinguishes between
knowledge that is already available in the firm at the time of entry (pre-entry experience), the
knowledge that is accumulated during the operation in the market since entry (post-entry ex-
perience) and the knowledge that is explicitly associated with innovative activities (innovative
experience). In this article we build on the work of Klepper (1996, 2002a,b) who uses survival
analyses for the investigation of the life cycle of various U.S. industries, including the auto-
mobile industry. We apply this approach and assess the role of knowledge over the life cycle
of the German automobile industry in the period 1886 to 1939. Our earlier results reported in3
Cantner et al. (2004, 2005) show that each of the three types of knowledge has an independent
effect on firm survival, even if all are included in the statistical analyses simultaneously.
To extend these results, the specific focus of this article is an investigation of whether and to
which extent the three forms of know-how are able to compensate each other. In particular,
we are interested in assessing whether an early entry in the industry which allows for rela-
tively more opportunities to accumulate post-entry experience is able to compensate for lack-
ing pre-entry experience and likewise whether innovative experience since entry is able to
compensate for lacking pre- or post-entry experience, respectively. Analyses of this type also
appear in Klepper and Simons (2005) as part of their evaluation of the empirical validity of
different theoretical explanations for industry shakeouts.
Following these introductory remarks we treat the three forms of compensation (pre-entry
versus post-entry experience, pre-entry experience versus innovative experience and post-
entry experience versus innovative experience) in the next three sections. A particularly illu-
minating interpretation in terms of Schumpeterian creative destruction is associated with the
compensation of lacking post-entry experience as a result of late entry into the industry by
innovative experience since entry. Two appendices deal with the data sources, the definition
of the variables and the solution to the simultaneity problem that arises in the econometric
analysis.
2.  Compensation I: Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience
Starting with the compensation of pre-entry and post-entry experience we divide the firms of
our sample into four disjoint groups. It is assumed that pre-entry experience exists if a firm is
either a spinoff or a diversifying firm. Post-entry experience is assumed to be associated with
the time of entry as quantified by the division of the firms into four entry cohorts. Firms that
entered in the first (from 1886 to 1901) or second entry cohorts (from 1902 to 1906) are clas-
sified as early entrants and firms that entered in the third (from 1907 to 1922) or forth cohorts
(from 1923 to 1939) are classified as late entrants. Based on that we divide our sample of
firms into the group of firms that entered early and are endowed with pre-entry experience
(early experienced firms), the group of firms that entered late and are endowed with pre-entry
experience (late experienced firms), the group of firms that entered early and are not endowed4
with pre-entry experience (early inexperienced firms) and finally the group of firms that en-
tered late and are not endowed with pre-entry experience (late inexperienced firms). Appendix
A contains the relevant information about the data sources and the definition of the indicators
for pre-entry and post-entry experience, as well as the indicator of innovative experience that
will be required further below.
This classification into early and late as well as experienced and inexperienced firms is typi-
cally used in a statistical survival analyses to assess the impact of the different knowledge
types on the survival or exit hazard of the firms. The methods applied there consist of the
nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of survivor curves (Kaplan and Meier (1958)) and the
semiparametric Cox regression for the hazard rate (Cox (1972)). Both methods are able to
take account of the right censored nature of the data. Since space considerations prevent a
detailed discussion of these methods, we refer the interested reader to Kiefer (1988) or Lan-
caster (1990) for more general treatments of methods for survival analysis and references to
economic applications.


























































Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience5
For the case of pre-entry versus post-entry experience figure 1 depicts the survivor curves
estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator on a logarithmic scale. In this exercise firms in the
first two entry cohorts are considered as early entrants, whereas firms in the last two entry
cohorts are considered as late entrants. As can be discerned from the figure, early experienced
firms have the best survival chances since their survival curve is the flattest and is thus asso-
ciated with the smallest hazard rate. Analogously, late inexperienced firms have the worst
survival chances and the largest hazard rates. Most interesting is the comparison of the early
inexperienced with the late experienced firms. The associated survivor curves suggest that late
experienced firms have a smaller exit hazard than the early inexperienced firms. This implies
that the existence of pre-entry experience is able to compensate for the disadvantages that
accrue from late entry into the market. The two survivor curves are not significantly different
in a statistical sense, however, in contrast to the visual impression. Applying the family of
tests described in Harrington and Fleming (1982), i.e. the variant associated with setting the
parameter ρ equal to zero, gives a p-value of about 0.34 in that case. In contrast, all other sur-
vivor curves are indeed significantly different from each other with very low p-values.
More exact statements about the compensation of pre-entry and post-entry experience can be
gained from an application of the Cox regression. In this method, the hazard rate of firm i out
of a sample of n firms that survives for at least  i t  years
n i t h t h i i i ,..., 1 , ) exp( ) ( ) ( 0 = ⋅ = β x
can be divided into the baseline hazard rate  ) ( 0 i t h  that exclusively depends on the duration of
survival and a second part that depends on the values of the explanatory variables for firm i,
contained in the row vector  i x , mediated by the exponential function. The method of partial
maximum likelihood estimation allows to estimate the parameters in the vector β without
requiring to estimate the baseline hazard rate which gives the whole procedure a distinct
semiparametric flavor (see again Kiefer (1988) or Lancaster (1990) for the details).6
Table 1
Cox Regressions for Pre-Entry versus Post-Entry Experience


























2 0.202 0.234 0.278
n 333 333 333












Note: p-values in parentheses below the coefficients.
In the present case the vector  i x  contains the three dummy variables indicating the affiliation
to the groups of the early experienced, late experienced and late inexperienced firms,
respectively. Since the four group classification of the firms is exhaustive, one category has to
be omitted from the regressions. Here, this omitted category is the group of the early inexpe-
rienced firms so that the parameter estimates represent the differences of the hazard rates of
the other groups relative to that reference group. All possibilities to divide the firms in the
four entry cohorts into early and late entrants are explored and the results for the Cox regres-
sions are shown in the columns of table 1. Accordingly, in model (A) the firms are divided
between the first and the second entry cohorts, so that the firms of the first cohort are consid-
ered as the early entrants and the firms of the second, third and forth cohorts are considered as
the late entrants. Analogously, in model (B) the division is between the second and the third
entry cohorts (as in figure 1) and in model (C) it is between the third and the forth entry co-
horts.
Considering the first two rows of the table which show the parameter estimates for the experi-
enced firms, we observe that all parameter estimates have a negative sign. The parameter es-
timates for the group of early experienced firms are largest in absolute magnitude and statisti-
cally different from zero (as is evident from the p-values in parentheses below the parameter7
estimates). This implies that the early experienced firms have the lowest exit hazards of all
groups. This finding holds irrespective of where the division in early and late entrants has
been implemented. Opposed to that, the parameter estimates for the late inexperienced firms
are consistently positive and significantly different from zero (on 5 percent level or lower),
implying the highest exit hazards and the worst survival chances for the firms in this group.
For the group of late experienced firms the reduction of the hazard rate that is associated with
negative parameter estimates which are, however, only significant on 10 percent level in the
case of model (A). Accepting this higher error probability, one can state that firms with pre-
entry experience that entered late into the market are faced with a lower exit risk compared to
firms of the reference group that entered early but were not endowed with pre-entry experi-
ence if earliness means membership in the first entry cohort. In this case pre-entry experience
is able to compensate for the disadvantages of late entry. Unfortunately, this form of compen-
sation is only weakly supported by the data because it is found only in the case of model (A)
on a 10 percent level of significance, but not in the case of models (B) and (C).
Further results reported in the table concern the differences of the exit hazards within the
group of experienced firms (comparing the parameter estimates in rows (1) and (2)) and
within the group of late entrants (comparing the parameter estimates in rows (2) and (3)). The
associated results for the t-statistics of the differences of the parameter estimates show that the
parameter estimates are significantly different with essentially zero p-values. This confirms
our findings in Cantner et al. (2004) that pre-entry experience and early entry are both signifi-
cantly reducing the exit hazard. The overall fit of the regressions can be judged from the row
R
2 and appears to be quite reasonable in all three regressions.
3.  Compensation II: Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience
We now turn to the investigation of the relation of the pre-entry experience and innovative
experience. Innovative experience is assumed to be associated with patenting (see e.g. Grili-
ches (1990)). Specifically, innovative experience is quantified by a dummy variable that is
equal to unity if a firm got granted at least one patent since it entered the automobile industry.
Combining this variable with the information about pre-entry experience we can again divide
the firms of our sample into four exhaustive groups. We are able to distinguish firms that are8
endowed with pre-entry experience and have been innovative since market entry (experienced
innovators), firms that are not endowed with pre-entry experience and have been innovative
since market entry (inexperienced innovators), firms that are endowed with pre-entry experi-
ence but have not been innovative since market entry (experienced noninnovators) and finally
firms that are not endowed with pre-entry experience and have not been innovative since
market entry (inexperienced noninnovators).
The graphical analysis of the survival chances of these four groups is shown in figure 2. The
survivor curves are again estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator. The figure shows clearly
that the experienced innovators have by far the best survival chances, whereas the inexperi-
enced noninnovators have the highest exit hazards. The survivor curves of the inexperienced
innovators and the experienced noninnovators are rather close and the test of Harrington and
Fleming (1982) does not reject the equality of these two survivor curves. Besides this excep-
tion all other survivor curves are statistically different from each other.


























































Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience9
The inference based on the Kaplan-Meier estimates may, however, be flawed since the as-
sessment of the effect of a firms innovative experience since entry on its hazard rate and
therefore on its duration of survival may be associated with a simultaneity problem. The rea-
son is that the longer the duration of survival of a firm, the higher is the probability of re-
ceiving at least one patent grant (and the higher is also the expected number of patents
granted). Thus, the patent variable is likely to be jointly determined with duration. This im-
plies that using any information contained in the patent data that refers to the period in which
a firm actually operates possibly leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates. In econometrics,
methods of instrumental variable estimation (sometimes referred to as two-stage least
squares) have been developed in order to achieve consistent estimates in such situations. To
solve the simultaneity problem we combine the idea of instrumental variables estimation with
the Cox regression and apply the bootstrap for computing correct standard errors (see appen-
dix B for a detailed description of the approach).
Table 2
Cox Regression for Pre-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience
Model (D)
(1) experienced innovators -1.763
(0.000)
(2) inexperienced innovators -1.645
(0.104)





t-statistic for (1) – (2) 0.117
(0.906)
t-statistic for (2) – (3) -2.022
(0.043)
Note: in parentheses below the coefficients are the p-values based on bootstrapped
standard errors as explained in appendix B.
For the instrumental variable estimates of the Cox regression reported in table 2 the set of
instruments consists of variables that are fixed at the time of entry and can therefore not be10
affected by the following events. In particular, the dummy variables for the first three entry
cohorts, the dummy variables on the type of market entry, a dummy variable indicating inno-
vative experience prior to market entry (equal to unity if patents are granted for the founder
before the firm enters the automobile industry), the number of patents granted before market
entry and its square as well as several interactions of the patent variables with the cohort
dummies and the dummies for the type of pre-entry experience are used as instruments.
The results show that the parameter estimates for both groups of innovators are negative, irre-
spective of their pre-entry experience. Although the estimates are only in the case of the expe-
rienced innovators statistically significant on 5 percent level, the magnitude of both parameter
estimates is quite similar. Thus, with respect to the omitted reference group of the experienced
noninnovators, innovating firms tend to have systematically better survival chances. This
further supports our findings reported in Cantner et al. (2005). As expected, the inexperienced
noninnovating firms are faced with the highest exit hazard, even higher than that of the refer-
ence group and statistically significant on 5 percent level. Based on these estimates we have
to be a little bit cautious with our conclusions regarding the compensation of pre-entry experi-
ence by innovative experience. The parameter that is associated with the dummy variable for
the inexperienced innovators and that represents the difference of the hazard rate to the expe-
rienced noninnovators has a p-value slightly above 0.1. Given that this parameter estimate is
indeed negative, this would imply that inexperienced innovators have a lower exit hazard than
experienced noninnovators. Then the disadvantages accruing from lacking experience before
market entry can be compensated by innovative experience since the time of entry.
In addition to these results the differences within the group of innovating firms (comparing
(1) and (2)) and the differences within the group of inexperienced firms (comparing (2) and
(3)) are also tested. The reported t-statistics show that the differences within the group of in-
novating firms are not statistically significant on conventional levels, but the differences
within the group of inexperienced firms are. Thus, for innovating firms the existence of expe-
rience before market entry or the lack of that form of knowledge does not make a difference
regarding their exit hazards. This may be explained by some kind of depreciation of pre-entry
experience (analogous to Carroll et al. (1996)) and further supports the assertion that innova-
tive experience can compensate for lacking pre-entry experience. In contrast, for the inexperi-
enced firms it is important to be innovative for achieving improvements of their survival
chances.11
4.  Compensation III: Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience
The final compensation relationship we want to investigate is that between post-entry experi-
ence and innovative experience since market entry. Therefore, we again construct four groups
of firms: firms that entered early and were innovative since entry (early innovators), firms that
entered late and were innovative since entry (late innovators), firms that entered early but
were not innovative since entry (early noninnovators) and finally firms that entered late and
were not innovative since entry (late noninnovators). Again, the three different possibilities to
define early and late entry provided by the four cohorts are exploited.


























































Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience
Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor curves for all four groups, where
the firms in the first two entry cohorts are treated as early entrants and the firms in the last
two entry cohorts are treated as late entrants. This figure provides a clear ranking of the four12
groups with respect to the survival chances of their member firms. The early innovators have
the best survival chances, followed by the late innovators. Compared to that, noninnovating
firms have larger exit hazards, with the early noninnovators being more successful than the
late noninnovators. Application of the Harrington-Fleming test shows that the differences
between all four survivor curves are statistically significant with very low p-values (all below
0.0025).
Especially the statistically significant difference between the survivor curves of the late inno-
vators and the early noninnovators opens up a very appealing economic interpretation. This
difference shows that firms that are faced with the disadvantage of being late in the market
but are innovative once entered have better survival chances than firms that have the advan-
tage of entering early but are not innovative since their entry. Thus, the disadvantages of late
entry can be compensated by innovative experience which implies that young innovative
firms tend to replace old, but noninnovative firms. This process resembles exactly the pattern
that Schumpeter (1942) had in mind when he coined notion of “creative destruction”, which
he described as revolutionizing “the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying
the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 83; emphasis in the origi-
nal).
A possible source of bias that may render the Kaplan-Meier estimates erroneous is the simul-
taneity problem already discussed at some length in the previous section. To safeguard against
this possibility, we again apply the instrumental variable Cox regression to this form of com-
pensation. The set of instrumental variables is the same as that used in the previous section.
Table 3 shows the corresponding results for three regressions with the three alternative divi-
sions of the firms into early and late entrants. In model (E) only the firms of the first entry
cohort are considered as early entrants, whereas in model (F) the firms of the first two cohorts
and in model (G) the firms of the first three cohorts are considered as early entrants. It is im-
portant to note at the outset that all parameter estimates are significantly different from zero,
the sole exception being the parameter estimate pertaining to the late noninnovators in model
(E). Recall that the parameter estimates in rows (1), (2) and (3) here again represent the de-
viations from the hazard rate of the omitted reference group of the early noninnovators.13
Table 3
Cox Regressions for Post-Entry Experience versus Innovative Experience


























2 0.206 0.250 0.264
n 333 333 333












Note: in parentheses below the coefficients are the p-values based on bootstrapped standard errors as
explained in appendix B.
The results confirm that innovating firms have consistently lower exit hazards than noninno-
vating firms, irrespective of their time of entry. Among the noninnovating firms, those classi-
fied as late noninnovators have higher exit hazards than the reference group of the early non-
innovators (however, this finding is not significant in the case of model (E)). Late innovators
have substantially better survival chances compared to late noninnovators, as the respective t-
statistics for the coefficient difference (2) – (3) show. The hazard rates for the early innova-
tors are slightly lower than that of the late innovators, but this difference is not statistically
significant as the respective t-statistics for (1) – (2) show. These findings parallel the analo-
gous results of Klepper and Simons (2005, table 4) for the U.S. automobile industry regarding
sign as well as significance and even roughly resemble the magnitude of the parameter esti-
mates.
Most important is the significantly negative parameter estimate for the late innovators show-
ing that firms that entered late but are innovative since then are faced with lower exit hazards
compared to the reference group of the early noninnovators. This finding that innovative ex-
perience is suitable to compensate for the disadvantages of late entry closely resembles the
conclusions from the Kaplan-Meier estimates. Moreover, this compensation consistently14
holds across all definitions of late and early entrants with respect to statistical significance and
is also of considerable magnitude. The hazard rate of late innovators is about 78 to 89 percent
lower than that of the early noninnovators. All this strongly suggests that the force of Schum-
peterian creative destruction appears to be a very robust and quantitatively important finding
in the German automobile industry.
5.  Summary and Conclusion
Summarizing the findings discussed above, it can be concluded that firms with pre-entry ex-
perience tend to be better off than inexperienced firms, that early entrants tend to be better off
than late entrants and that innovative firms (with at least one patent since entry) tend to be
better off than noninnovative firms, always expressed in terms of better survival chances.
Moreover, each of the three knowledge components has a separate effect on the exit hazard as
found by Cantner et al. (2005). The value added of this article consists of a detailed examina-
tion of the possibility that one knowledge component dominates another knowledge compo-
nent in that it is able to compensate for the lack of the other knowledge component, again in
terms of survival chances. These results are not restricted to the German automobile industry;
the already mentioned article of Klepper and Simons (2005) reports similar results for several
U.S. industries.
Regarding this compensation issue the results give a rather weak indication for the compen-
sation of post-entry knowledge by pre-entry knowledge, a marginally significant indication of
compensation of pre-entry knowledge by innovative experience and a strongly significant
indication of compensation of post-entry knowledge by innovative experience. Thus, the rela-
tion of the three knowledge components satisfies transitivity with innovative knowledge
weakly dominating pre-entry knowledge and pre-entry knowledge weakly dominating post-
entry knowledge. Furthermore, the results reported above establish that knowledge accumu-
lated by innovative experience is able to compensate for lacking pre-entry and post-entry ex-
perience. This gives rise to the conclusion that knowledge accumulated by innovative experi-
ence is the single most important type of knowledge for long-run firm survival.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the decision to be innovative can be made by the firm
itself, whereas pre-entry experience and time of entry are fixed once a firm enters the market.15
The firms are able to improve their survival chances by engaging in innovative experience,
but they can not influence their pre-entry experience or their time of entry. So the survival
chances of firms are not fixed at the time of entry because of their founding characteristics,
instead they are mainly determined by their decision about innovative experience.
Appendix A: Data Sources and Variable Definitions
The basis of the statistical analyses performed in this paper is a data set of German firms
which produce automobiles during the period 1886 to 1939,
1 their experience before they en-
tered into the market and the patents they hold. The data set is the same as used in Cantner et
al. (2005). We have collected data only for automobile manufacturing firms, excluding their
suppliers and trucks producers. The data we gathered pertain to the year of entry (start of the
automobile production), the year of exit (due to the stop of the automobile production, merg-
ers or acquisitions). Relevant for the survival analysis is the number of years a firm was actu-
ally producing automobiles and not the years in which the firm merely existed. We further
collected data regarding the type of entry (explained below).
The data are assembled from a multitude of different sources, such as yearbooks, historical
and statistical journals and books about veteran cars. The most important sources are Doyle
and Georgano (1963), Flik (2001), Köhler (1966), Kubisch (1983), Oswald (1996), Schrader
(2002), von Fersen (1967, 1968) and von Seherr-Thoss (1979). From these sources we identi-
fied 441 firms that produced automobiles at some time during 1886 to 1939. The data are cen-
sored at 1939 after which the German economy became increasingly regulated and adapted to
war production. As in Köhler (1966) we assign 1915 as the year of exit to those firms that exit
the market as a cause of World War I. The peak of the number of firms is reached in 1924
with 139 firms. Thereafter the German automobile industry experienced the typical shakeout
and the number of firms declined to 26 until the year 1939.
(1) Pre-entry experience
The classification of the type of entry is implemented according to Klepper (2002b). He dis-
tinguishes experienced firms (firms that diversify into the production of automobiles origi-
                                                          
1 The history of the German automobile industry started in 1886 with the inventions of Gottlieb Daimler and
Karl Benz, who worked independent of each other.16
nating from other industries), experienced entrepreneurs (de novo firms whose founder
headed and typically owned a part of another firm before), spinoffs (de novo firms whose
founder worked in the automobile industry before) and inexperienced firms. Firms that pro-
duced automobiles, were forced to exit and later on produced automobiles again are treated as
different firms and are classified as spinoffs when they enter the market a second time.
(2) Post-entry experience
The classification of the entry cohorts is based on Klepper (2002a). He defines the cohorts so
that there are at least 15 firms in every cohort which survived for at least 15 years. This pro-
cedure results in four entry cohorts, the first with 56 firms ranging from 1886 to 1901, the
second with 53 firms from 1902 to 1906, the third with 126 firms from 1907 to 1922 and the
fourth with 116 firms from 1923 to 1939. In the fourth cohort there are 11 firms that survived
for at least 15 years.
(3) Innovative experience
The data about a firm’s innovative experience are based on the patent grants of these firms.
The search procedure is described in detail by Cantner et al. (2005). Since this procedure was
based on the patent documents it is evident that patent grants are used, but recorded in the
data set is the year of the application. The reason is that although there is a time lag between
the application and the grant (see Griliches (1990)), the knowledge represented by the inno-
vation is available for the firm at least since the date of application. Some patents were ap-
plied together by two or more automobile firms. These patents were assigned to all applying
firms, justified by the argument of Romer (1990) that all firms can use the associated know-
how simultaneously. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, the patents of the merged (re-
spectively acquired) firms were assigned to the new firm. As an example, after the merger of
Wanderer, DKW, Horch and Audi to Auto-Union in 1932 (recorded in the data set as DKW),
all patents that were applied for by Wanderer, Horch or Audi were assigned to DKW as the
continuing firm.
All results reported in this article are based on the sample of the 333 firms for which all re-
quired data are available. Mergers and acquisitions are handled as in Klepper (2002a, p. 42).
In the cases of mergers the firm with the same name as the new group or the largest firm (if
the new group has a new name) is treated as continuing, the others are treated as censored
exits. In the case of acquisitions, the absorbing firm is treated as continuing if it produces17
automobiles and the acquired firm is treated as a censored exit. If the absorbing firm does not
produce automobiles, the acquired firm is treated as continuing.
Appendix B: Cox Regression with Instrumental Variables
Our estimation methodology relies on three basic building blocks. It combines (1) the idea of
generalized instrumental variables estimation (GIVE) with (2) the semiparametric Cox regres-
sion. Since the standard errors (and therefore t-statistics and p-values) of the regression coef-
ficients obtained from this procedure do not adequately reflect the additional estimation un-
certainty that is introduced by the construction of the instrumental variables, correct standard
errors are computed by (3) the design matrix variant of the bootstrap.
(1) Instrumental Variables
In this procedure the endogenous regressors are projected on to the space spanned by the ex-
ogenous regressors and the instruments in the first step, which are chosen to assures their un-
correlatedness with the error terms. Considered as instrumental variables are here only those
data series that represent characteristics of the firms that are fixed once and for all before their
entry into the automobile industry. The guiding idea is that such predetermined variables rep-
resent information that may have an effect on the duration of survival but are by construction
not affected by the duration themselves. Among the data series available, the cohort dummies,
the classification of pre-entry experience and the number of patent grants before the recorded
time of entry are valid candidates for instrumental variables.
Let n denote the sample size and k the number of explanatory regressors on the right hand
side of the regression equation and define X as the n×k matrix of all (exogenous and endoge-
nous) regressors and W as the n×l matrix (with  k l ≥ ) containing both exogenous regressors
and instruments. Both matrices are assumed to contain a column of ones representing the in-
tercept. Then the linear projection of X on to W is equivalent to the matrix operation
X W W W W X ' ) ' ( ˆ 1 − =  where the prime denotes matrix transposition. This amounts to the
calculation of the fitted values of a linear regression of the columns of X on W. Accordingly,
since the exogenous regressors are contained in W this operation does not affect the columns
of the exogenous regressors but expresses the endogenous regressors as optimal (in the least
squares sense) linear combinations of the variables in W. Since all variables in W are prede-18
termined by assumption, the variables in the resulting matrix X ˆ  are exogenous as well by the
properties of orthogonal projections (see Davidson and MacKinnon (2003, pp. 57ff.) for more
on the geometry of orthogonal projections). The matrix X ˆ  is subsequently used instead of the
original regressors X for the estimation of the Cox regression in the second step.
(2) Cox Regression
In this second step the semiparametric Cox regression (Cox (1972)) is executed in order to
estimate the parameters β of the hazard rate
) ˆ exp( ) ( ) ( 0 β xi i i t h t h ⋅ =
specified in proportional hazards form, where  ) ( 0 i t h  denotes the baseline hazard rate that
exclusively depends on the duration of firm i,  i t , and  i x ˆ  denotes the ith row of X ˆ ,  n i ,..., 1 = .
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the so-called partial likelihood function, which
allows to estimate β independent of the specific functional form of the baseline hazard rate,
simultaneously accounting for the effects of censoring. In practice, numerical and tractability
considerations lead to the maximization of the log of the partial likelihood function. The abil-
ity of the Cox regression to estimate β without requiring the specification of the functional
form of the baseline hazard rate underlines the semiparametric character of the procedure. The
resulting estimate is denoted by β ˆ . A brief and illuminating exposition of the reasoning be-
hind the partial likelihood estimation is given by Kiefer (1988).
(3) Design Matrix Bootstrap
The preceding two steps of our approach will produce consistent estimates of the parameters,
but the raw combination of these two methods will result in flawed statistical inference since
the regressors used are generated by the projection operation in the first step. To obtain stan-
dard errors that are corrected for these biases, the design matrix variant of the bootstrap (al-
ternatively called bootstrapping cases or bootstrapping pairs) is used (see Davison and
Hinkley (1997) for a general reference on bootstrapping). According to Davison and Hinkley
(1997, p. 87) this procedure is also justified in the present case of censored data if the cen-
soring information is included in the process of repeated sample drawing.
The p-values that are reported jointly with the coefficient estimates are throughout computed
with the aid of the design matrix bootstrap. This approach usually performs well even if some19
forms of heteroskedasticity are present. The design matrix bootstrap is based on randomly
drawn samples (with replacement), each of size n from the rows of the original data
) , , , ( W X d y , where y containes the duration data, i.e.  )' ,..., ( 1 n t t = y . Note the data also
include the instrumental variables as well as the censoring information in the n×1 dummy
vector d. The resulting bootstrap samples are denoted by  ) , , , (
* * * * W X d y . Repeating this
procedure B times and conducting the first two steps for each bootstrap sample results in B
different bootstrap estimates for the Cox regression coefficients, denoted 
* *
1 ˆ ,..., ˆ
B β β . From
these the bootstrap estimate of the covariace matrix of the coefficients can be computed by
∑ =
− − − ⋅ − =
B
b b b B
1




1 * ˆ Σ b
B
b B β β =
− ⋅ = . The p-values for the null hypothesis  0 : 0 = j β H  for the jth
coefficient is then based on the t-statistic 
2 / 1 * ) ˆ ( ˆ − ⋅ = jj j j v β τ  which is distributed as standard
normal asymptotically. In this formula 
* ˆ jj v  denotes the jth diagonal element of the bootstrap
covariance matrix 
* ˆ V and is thus a correct estimate for the variance of the jth regression
coefficient,  } ,..., 1 { k j∈ . Since the test is two-tailed, the p-values can be explicitly computed
by |)) (| 1 ( 2 ˆ
j j τ Φ p − = , where  ) ( Φ ⋅  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution
function.
All p-values that are reported in this paper are based on  1000 = B  bootstrap replications. This
is much more than actually necessary to satisfy the rule of thumb recommending that “seldom
are more than  200 = B  replications needed for estimating a standard error” (Efron and
Tibshirani (1993, p. 52)).
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